





























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Aufderheide, J. (2017). Is Aristotle a Virtue Ethicist? In Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and
Sacred Cows Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. DOI: 10.1017/9781108163866
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Feb. 2018
Penultimate Draft. Citable version in Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 
ed. Verity Harte and Raphael Woolf (in press, Cambridge UP). 
 1 
CHAPTER	TEN	
IS	ARISTOTLE	A	VIRTUE	ETHICIST?	Joachim	Aufderheide		1.	INTRODUCTION	Aristotle	is	the	sacred	cow	of	virtue	ethicists.	Or	perhaps	better:	he	is	one	of	the	sacred	 cows.	 Defining	 ‘virtue	 ethics’	 ostensively	 by	 pointing	 at	 Aristotle	 was	 useful	when	virtue	ethics	was	 revived	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century.	Now	virtue	ethics	no	 longer	needs	 to	 piggy	 back	 on	 Aristotle:	 neo-Aristotelian	 ethics	 is	 regarded	 as	 merely	 one	species	 of	 the	 genus	 ‘virtue	 ethics’,	 among	 Confucian,	 Humean	 and	 even	 Nietzschean	species.1	While	 virtue	 ethics	 does	 not	 entail	 Aristotelian	 ethics,	 few	 adherents	 of	 the	creed	deny	Aristotle’s	quasi-sacred	status:	non-Aristotelian	virtue-ethicists	have	tried	to	broaden	their	sect,	not	to	kill	one	of	their	sacred	cows.		Since	 virtue	 ethics	 stands	 on	 its	 own	 two	 feet	 now,	 we	 can	 reasonably	 ask	whether	Aristotle’s	ethics	is	a	species	of	virtue	ethics	—	just	as	we	can	reasonably	ask	whether	Plato	 is	a	Platonist,	or	whether	Kant	 is	a	Kantian.	But	why	ask	 the	question?	Plato’s	case	 illustrates	the	point:	many	students	come	to	Plato	with	the	preconception	that	he	believes	in	heavy-duty	Forms	and	that	he	has	certain	outlandish	views	about	the	soul.	Worse,	many	read	Plato	only	 to	confirm	their	Platonist	view	of	Plato	 (and	never	grow	 out	 of	 it).	 Similarly,	 if	 we	 approach	 Aristotle’s	 ethics	 expecting	 to	 find	 a	 virtue	ethics,	 we	may	 oversimplify	 his	 ethics	 or	 get	 them	wrong.2	 So,	 why	 not	 simply	 read	Aristotle	and	put	the	question	of	virtue	ethics	to	one	side?	Asking	whether	Aristotle	is	a	virtue	ethicist	serves	two	purposes:	to	inform	contemporary	virtue	ethics,	insofar	as	an	answer	may	 present	 a	more	 nuanced	 connection	 between	 Aristotle	 and	 virtue	 ethics	than	usually	 taken	 for	 granted;	 and	 to	 improve	our	understanding	of	 the	 structure	of	Aristotle’s	ethics,	 insofar	as	certain	of	 its	structural	 features	are	highlighted	by	asking	questions	arising	from	virtue	ethics.	Thus,	by	studying	each	theory	in	its	own	right,	but	with	a	view	to	comparing	them,	we	can	gain	a	new	and	illuminating	perspective	on	both.		But	how	to	line	up	virtue	ethics	and	Aristotle’s	ethics	with	a	view	to	comparing	them?	 Are	 we	 not	 distorting	 Aristotle’s	 ethical	 theorising	 if	 we	 bring	 a	 distinctly	
                                                       If	I	have	learnt	anything	from	MM	McCabe	about	doing	ancient	philosophy,	then	it	is	to	start	with	the	text,	read	the	text	carefully	and	try	to	figure	out	what	the	text	says	in	its	own	right.	She	has,	moreover,	the	gift	of	bringing	dead	philosophers	alive	by	inviting	us	to	 look	 at	 our	 questions	 and	 concerns	 from	 their	 perspective.	 In	my	 tribute	 to	 her,	 I	hope	to	catch	some	of	her	magic.	1	See	the	papers	in	Russell	2013.	2	Since	most	philosophers	take	Aristotle	to	be	a	virtue	ethicist	per	default	(‘virtue	ethics	is	 what	 Aristotle	 did’,	 Putnam	 1988,	 p.	 379),	 hardly	 anyone	 explicitly	 argues	 that	Aristotle	is	a	virtue	ethicist	(with	the	exception	of	Mcaleer	2007).	
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contemporary	 question	 to	 his	 text	 and	 expect	 Aristotle	 to	 have	 an	 answer?3	 Every	serious	scholar	takes	care	not	to	simply	apply	our	conceptual	framework	to	Aristotle’s	texts,	 or	 any	 framework	 alien	 to	 Aristotle’s.	 We	 can	 avoid	 the	 problem	 of	 distorting	Aristotle	by	construing	the	title	question	as	a	question	about	the	relationship	between	ethically	good	action	and	virtue.	While	I	do	start	with	our	question,	not	Aristotle’s,	the	relevant	texts	nevertheless	show	his	theoretical	commitments	—	if	read	properly.	And	read	 the	 texts	we	must:	 rather	 than	comparing	Aristotle’s	politico-ethical	system	on	a	grand	scale	 to	contemporary	virtue	ethics,4	 I	propose	 to	concentrate	on	key	 texts,	 the	definition	of	virtue	in	2.6	and	the	good	person	as	measure	in	3.4.		2.	VIRTUE	ETHICS	AS	ETHICAL	THEORY	Most	contemporary	virtue	ethicists	see	themselves	as	proposing	and	defending	a	distinct	approach	to	ethics,	distinct	from	its	deontological	and	consequentialist	rivals.5	We	 should	 not	 confuse	 virtue	 ethics	with	 virtue	 theory.	 If	we	 do,	we	might	 be	 led	 to	conclude	that	virtue	ethics	could	not	be	‘a	thing	on	its	own’	because	virtue	theory	‘is	so	obviously	 an	 important	 element	 of	 both	 [Kantianism	 and	 Utilitarianism]’.6	 A	 virtue	theory	studies	the	nature	of	the	virtues	(which	traits	are	virtues;	how	to	acquire	them;	their	moral	 psychology),	 usually	without	making	 a	 deeper	 theoretical	 commitment	 to	any	 specific	 ethical	 theory,	 whereas	 virtue	 ethics	 seeks	 to	 provide	 a	 fully-fledged	normative	 theory,	 comparable	 in	 scope	 to	 its	 perceived	 rivals.	 Both	Kant	 and	Mill	 do	study	 the	 nature	 of	 virtue,	 but	 without	 endorsing	 a	 virtue	 ethics.	 Observing	 the	distinction	between	virtue	theory	and	virtue	ethics,	we	must	ask	what	role	virtue	would	need	to	play	in	virtue	ethics	as	a	distinct	approach	to	normative	ethics.		Given	 the	 variety	 of	 virtue	 ethical	 approaches,	 we	 should	 not	 become	exasperated	over	the	vague	answer	‘that	a	theory	is	virtue	ethical	if	virtue	notions	are	
sufficiently	central	in	that	theory’.7	While	this	“definition”	fails	to	specify	the	role	virtue	or	virtue-notions	need	to	play	in	a	virtue	ethics,	it	pushes	us	towards	considering	what	is	 central	 to	 an	 ethical	 theory	—	and	we	 clearly	 can	have	 a	 plurality	 of	 concerns:	 for	instance	moral	epistemology,	reasons,	motives,	consequences,	happiness,	emotions	and	right	action.	 Instead	of	considering	the	whole	gamut	of	concerns,	 I	shall	 focus	only	on	
                                                       3	For	an	excellent	exploration	of	Aristotle’s	relation	to	contemporary	ethical	theorising,	see	Broadie	2007	who	also	touches	on	my	title	question.	4	 Like	 Simpson	 1992	 and	 Buckle	 2002,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 degree	 Santas	 1993	—	 all	 of	whom	dissociate	Aristotle	from	virtue	ethics.	5	At	the	end	of	the	 last	century	Rosalind	Hursthouse	hoped	that	 ‘future	generations	of	moral	 philosophers	 …	 will	 lose	 interest	 in	 classifying	 themselves	 as	 following	 one	approach	 rather	 than	 another;	 in	 which	 case	 all	 three	 labels	 [sc.	 deontology,	consequentialism	 and	 virtue	 ethics]	 might	 become	 of	 merely	 historical	 interest’	(Hursthouse	1999:	5).	However,	two	pages	later,	she	declares	that	‘[a]s	things	are	now,	the	approach	is	still	new	enough	to	be	distinctive’.	6		Nussbaum	1999:	167,	who	does	not	make	the	distinction.	7		Swanton	2013:	334.	Nussbaum	1999:	201,	proposes	‘to	do	away	with	the	category	of	“virtue	ethics”’	because	of	the	variety	of	virtue	ethical	approaches.	
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right	 action	or	 rather	 ethically	 good	 action	—	not	because	 a	 virtue	 ethical	 account	 of	right	action	defines	virtue	ethics,	but	because	this	concern,	more	than	the	others,	helps	differentiate	normative	theories.	An	account	of	ethically	good	action	—	my	neutral	term	for	 right,	 good,	 or	 appropriate	 action	—	 is	 central	 to	 an	 ethical	 theory:8	 it	 provides	 a	framework	 that	 enables	 us	 to	 evaluate	 and	 justify	 what	 we	 or	 others	 should	 do	 or	should	have	done.9	While	different	species	of	virtue	ethics	differ	significantly	over	the	roles	 of	 motives	 and	 happiness,	 they	 agree	 on	 a	 general	 level	 in	 their	 accounts	 of	ethically	 good	 action.	 Moreover,	 if	 two	 ethical	 theories	 have	 substantially	 different	accounts	 of	 ethically	 good	 action,	 they	 belong	 to	 distinct	 genera.	 However	 much	Kantians	and	consequentialists	can	learn	from	virtue	ethics	about	emotions	or	practical	reasoning,	i.e.	however	much	they	adopt	for	their	respective	virtue	theory,	they	cannot	adopt	 a	 virtue	 ethical	 account	 of	 ethically	 good	 action.	 The	 account	 of	 ethically	 good	action	 is	 a	 fault	 line	 of	 ethical	 theories;	 the	 other	 concerns	 provide	 less	 clear-cut	divisions.10	Whether	Aristotle	has	a	virtue	ethics	thus	hangs	on	his	account	of	ethically	good	action.		All	 species	 of	 virtue	 ethics	 that	 purport	 to	 offer	 a	 normative	 ethics	 deny	 that	ethically	good	action	can	be	defined	independently	of	virtue.	While	different	species	will	spell	out	the	relation	differently,	we	can	take	the	dependence	of	ethically	good	action	on	virtue	 as	 a	 distinguishing	mark	 of	 virtue	 ethics:	 the	 genus	 ‘virtue	 ethics’	 differs	 from	other	genera	of	moral	 theories	 in	making	ethically	good	action	dependent	on	virtue.11	Virtue	 terms	which	 define	 ethically	 good	 action	must	 therefore	 not	 rely	 on	 any	 prior	notion	of	ethically	good	action.	In	particular,	when	defining	certain	traits	of	character	as	virtues,	 the	 definientia	 must	 not	 smuggle	 in	 other	 normatively	 foundational	 notions	specifiable	independently	of	virtue,	such	as	law	or	the	good,	a	point	which	applies	to	all	virtue	 ethical	 definitions	 of	 right	 action.	 To	 examine	 the	 relation	 between	 virtue	 and	
                                                       8	I	use	’ethically	good	action’	instead	of	‘morally	good’	in	order	a)	to	remain	neutral	on	the	question	whether	Aristotle	had	a	conception	of	morality	similar	to	our	own	(denied,	perhaps	most	prominently,	by	Anscombe	1958),	and	b)	 to	bring	out	 that	 for	Aristotle	there	is	something	good	about	right	actions,	however	difficult	it	may	be	to	specify	just	what	 this	 ‘something’	 is.	 I	 am	not	 suggesting	 that	 the	goodness	alone	 fixes	 the	ethical	status	of	the	action;	I	do	not	presuppose	a	teleological	or	deontological	framework.	9	I	omit	action	guidance	deliberately,	as	the	theoretical	account	of	right	action	need	not,	and	in	many	cases	does	not,	guide	action	in	the	sense	that	the	agent	uses	the	account	of	right	action	to	determine	the	thing	to	be	done.	The	point	applies	not	only	to	many	forms	of	 consequentialism	 and	 deontology,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 canonical,	 though	 slightly	disreputable,	virtue	ethical	account	of	right	action	as	‘an	action	is	right	if	and	only	if	it	is	what	the	virtuous	person	would	do.’	10	For	instance,	both	deontologist	and	consequentialist	theories	can	embrace	the	insight	that	wisdom	(phronēsis)	provides	the	best	and	sometimes	the	only	guide	to	finding	out	the	right	thing	to	do	in	a	particular	situation	(pace	Mcaleer	2007:	220).	11	Cf.	Russell	2009:	65-70	and	105.	A	virtue	ethical	definition	of	 ethically	 good	action	may	either	appeal	only	to	notions	wholly	derivable	from	virtue	or	virtue	terms,	or,	more	weakly,	 appeal	 to	 notions	 that	 are	 not	 wholly	 independent	 of	 virtue	 notions	 (cf.	Swanton	2013).	
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ethically	good	action	 in	Aristotle,	 I	 shall	ask	 two	questions:	a)	 is	ethically	good	action	dependent	on	virtue?	And	b)	is	virtue	dependent	on	ethically	good	action?		Although	Aristotle	does	not	explicitly	use	the	concepts	of	theoretical	dependence	or	independence	in	the	Ethics,	he	would	recognise	at	least	three	ways	in	which	ethically	good	action	could	depend	on	virtue,	were	ethically	good	action	to	depend	on	virtue:	i)	a	person	must	 attain	 virtue	 before	 being	 able	 to	 perform	 ethically	 good	 actions;	 ii)	 the	definition	 of	 ethically	 good	 action	 relies	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 virtue	which	 in	 turn	 can	 be	defined	 without	 reference	 to	 ethically	 good	 action;	 and	 iii)	 the	 virtuous	 person,	 her	reason	or	responses,	at	least	partly	constitutes	what	counts	as	ethically	good	action	—	which	obviously	resonates	with	 i)	and	 ii).	Aristotle	understands	 the	 first	 two	kinds	of	dependence	in	terms	of	priority:	virtue	may	be	temporally	prior	to	ethically	good	action	and/or	 prior	 in	 account	 and	 knowledge.12	 Following	 Aristotle’s	 terminology,	 I	 shall	pursue	my	title	question	in	terms	of	priority:	if	the	definition	of	virtue	does	not	rely	on	a	prior	notion	of	ethically	good	action	and	if	the	account	of	ethically	good	action	does	rely	on	a	prior	notion	of	virtue,	 then	Aristotle’s	ethical	theory	is	a	virtue	ethics;	 if	virtue	is	defined	through	a	prior	notion	of	ethically	good	action,	and	ethically	good	action	does	not	in	turn	rely	on	a	prior	notion	of	virtue,	then	the	structure	of	Aristotle’s	ethics	differs	from	that	of	contemporary	virtue	ethics	and	we	should	not	“make”	him	a	virtue	ethicist.		3.	VIRTUE,	ETHICALLY	GOOD	ACTION	AND	THE	MIDDLE	Examining	 the	 relative	 priority	 of	 virtue	 and	 ethically	 good	 action	 raises	 a	difficulty:	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 neat	 definition	 of	 ethically	 good	 action.	 Ethics	starts	 from	the	question	how	one	should	 live.	While	much	of	recent	moral	philosophy	concentrates	 on	 actions,	 Aristotle	 offers	 a	 much	 wider	 perspective:	 the	 quality	 (or	success/failure)	of	a	life	depends	not	only	on	individual	actions,	but	also	importantly	on	the	states	of	character	of	the	person	living	it,	together	with	the	moral	psychology	tied	to	character.	Many	recent	virtue	ethicists,	starting	from	Anscombe,	welcome	this	change	in	view	and	suggest	we	follow	Aristotle	in	making	states	of	character	the	primary	ethical	notions.	 Although	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 explicitly	 define	 ethically	 good	 action,	 we	 can	examine	the	relation	between	virtue	and	ethically	good	action	through	studying	the	so-called	 ‘doctrine	of	 the	mean’	 from	which	we	 can	 glean	Aristotle’s	 account	 of	 ethically	good	action.13		3.1	Ethically	good	action	and	the	middle	Aristotle	introduces	the	notion	of	the	‘middle’	in	his	discussion	of	habituation	in	2.4.	Good	building	and	good	actions	within	 the	 spheres	of	 justice	or	 courage	help	 the	
                                                       12	I	do	not	think	that	virtue	is	prior	in	the	first	sense	in	2.4,	but	I	cannot	argue	for	it	here.	In	Met.	9.8	Aristotle	additionally	mentions	‘priority	in	being’	in	an	argument	to	establish	the	priority	of	actuality	over	potentiality.	13	While	I	keep	the	conventional	‘doctrine	of	the	mean’,	I	shall	usually	translate	meson	as	‘middle’	 and	mesotēs	 as	 ‘middle	 state’,	 the	 most	 basic	 meaning.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 his	discussion,	Aristotle	expands	on	how	we	should	understand	the	words.	
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learner	 attain	 the	 desired	 craft	 or	 virtue,	 and	 good	 actions	 accord	with	 right	 reason:	learner	and	expert	alike	must	do	what	is	right,	appropriate,	good,	or	reasonable	within	the	sphere	of	action	(they	must	act	kata	ton	orthon	logon,	1103b31-2).	But	what	is	the	right	 and	 good	 thing	 to	 do	 apart	 from	 ‘acting	 in	 accord	with	 right	 reason’?	 Aristotle	responds	by	invoking	what	turns	out	to	be	a	central	feature	of	his	theory	of	virtue:	the	middle,	a	highly	context-sensitive	notion	(1104a3-10).	Aristotle	introduces	the	concepts	of	 ‘excess’	and	 ‘deficiency’	with	the	examples	of	strength	and	health	(1104a14-18).	To	become	strong,	you	must	train	neither	deficiently,	nor	excessively.	The	example	should	be	 familiar	enough	to	 illustrate	Aristotle’s	point:	 training	 too	often,	or	 for	 too	 long,	or	with	weights	 too	heavy,	or	at	 the	wrong	time	—	all	of	 these	dimensions	contribute	 to	the	quality	of	the	training,	and	getting	them	wrong	will	lead	to	inferior	results.	Getting	the	dimensions	right	—	or,	as	Aristotle	says,	doing	what	is	well-measured	(summetros,	a18),	 lying	 between	 deficiency	 and	 excess	 (cf.	 a25-6)	—	will	 help	 attain	 the	 desired	state.	Similarly,	both	fleeing	or	facing	every	danger	are	excessive	or	deficient	responses	compared	 to	 the	 courageous	 person’s	 response:	 she	 runs	 or	 stays	 only	 when	appropriate	 because	 she	discerns	 the	 relevant	 features	 of	 the	 situation,	 an	 ability	 the	learner	can	only	acquire	with	a	measured	or	middle	approach	to	facing	danger	(cf.	a25-7).	 	Expert	and	learner	alike	must	do	the	just	or	moderate	things	—	actions	which	lie	in	 the	 middle	 and	 are	 characteristic	 of	 virtue.	 Aristotle	 spells	 out	 the	 dimensions	 in	which	emotional	and	practical	responses	must	hit	the	middle	to	count	as	best:	neither	too	much	nor	too	 little,	at	 the	right	times,	with	reference	to	the	right	objects,	 towards	the	right	people,	with	 the	right	aim	and	 in	 the	right	way	(1106b18-24).	Aristotle	 thus	specifies	praiseworthy	actions	otherwise	than	by	applying	virtue	terms:	‘excessive	and	deficient	responses	are	wrong	and	censured,	whereas	the	middle	 is	praised	and	right’	(b25-27).14	If	we	follow	Aristotle	in	going	beyond	the	virtue	terms	in	act	appraisal,	we	should	not	stop	at	the	notion	of	right	reason	—	which	Aristotle	sets	aside	—	but	go,	with	Aristotle,	 all	 the	way	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 the	middle	 response.	 Since,	 then,	 the	 notion	 of	middle	response	plays	a	central	role	in	Aristotle’s	account	of	action,	I	suggest	we	regard	hitting	the	middle	in	action	as	roughly	equivalent	to	the	sought	after	notion	of	ethically	good	action.		3.2	Virtue	and	the	middle	The	 central	 importance	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 the	 mean	 also	 shows	 in	 the	identification	of	the	virtues.	Neo-Aristotelian	virtue	ethicists	tend	to	identify	the	virtues	by	 reference	 to	 human	 flourishing,	 or	 happiness.15	While	Aristotle	 acknowledges	 that	‘the	virtue	of	a	human	being	 is	 the	state	of	character	on	which	her	goodness	depends	and	as	a	result	of	which	she	will	accomplish	her	function	well’	(1106a22-4),	he	does	not	try	 to	 derive	 any	 specific	 virtues	 from	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 human	 good.	 The	 quote	
                                                       14	Following	Rassow’s	text	as	reported	in	Susemihl’s	apparatus.		15	See	especially	Hursthouse	1999.	
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invokes	 the	 famous	argument	 from	1.7	 in	which	Aristotle	gives	 content	 to	 the	human	good,	happiness,	by	considering	the	human	function:	accomplishing	the	human	function	well,	exercising	the	rational	part	of	the	soul	well,	is	exercising	the	virtues.	But	relying	on	the	bipartition	of	the	soul	into	irrational	and	rational	(obedient	and	directive),	Aristotle	concludes	only	that	 there	must	be	virtues	of	character	and	virtues	of	 intellect,	both	of	which	are	pertinent	to	happiness	(1.13).	Thus	the	definition	of	happiness,	and	therefore	what	 is	 good	 for	 the	 possessor	 of	 virtue,	 is	 too	 general	 to	 identify	 specific	 virtues	 of	character,	especially	if	the	virtues	are	moralistically	conceived.16			Aristotle	 presents	 a	 list	 of	 virtues.	 In	 2.7	 he	 enumerates	 eleven	 virtues,	apparently	displayed	on	a	chart	(ek	tēs	graphēs,	1107a33-4)	without	indicating	how	he	created	the	 list.17	The	list,	moreover,	does	not	merely	 illustrate	the	sort	of	virtues	one	could	analyse:	 turning	 to	 the	 individual	virtues,	he	wants	 to	show	 ‘what	 they	are,	and	what	they	relate	to,	and	how.	And	at	the	same	time	it	will	be	obvious	how	many	there	are’	 (3.5.1115a4-5),	 by	 which	 he	 either	 means	 to	 highlight	 the	 numerousness	 of	 the	virtues	(as	opposed	to	Plato’s	cardinal	virtues),	or	else	to	offer	a	closed	list.	In	any	case,	the	whole	discussion	of	ethical	virtue	relies	on	the	doctrine	of	the	mean:	not	only	does	the	 list	of	virtues	 in	2.7	sandwich	each	virtue	between	 two	vices;	Aristotle	also	 trusts	that	 ‘we	will	understand	the	character	traits	more	fully	if	we	go	through	them	case	by	case,	and	we	will	be	more	firmly	convinced	that	the	virtues	are	middle	states	when	we	see,	synoptically,	 that	 it	 is	so	 in	every	case’	 (4.7.1127a15-17).	So,	while	 the	content	of	happiness	(and	benefit)	constrains	which	traits	count	as	virtues,	key	to	identifying	the	virtues	for	Aristotle	is	the	doctrine	of	the	mean.18		We	can	now	reformulate	 the	question	whether	ethically	good	action	 is	prior	 to	virtue	 or	 vice	 versa	 in	 terms	 of	 the	middle:	what	 is	 the	 relation	 between	 the	middle	response	in	action,	and	virtue	as	a	middle	state	between	two	vices?	A	virtuous	person	will	respond	well	both	in	action	and	affection	to	any	given	situation	because	virtue	aims	at	 and	hits	 the	middle	 (tou	mesou	…	 stochastikē,	 1106b15-16).	But	does	 the	 response	count	as	middle	because	it	stems	from	a	middle	state?	Or	does	the	state	count	as	middle	because	it	tends	towards	middle	responses?	Which	middle,	in	other	words,	is	prior?			 	
                                                       16	Happiness	is	specified	by	reference	to	certain	aspects	in	which	a	human	life	must	go	well.	 If	 these	 aspects	 include	 doing	 the	 right	 thing,	 understood	 independently	 from	Aristotle’s	virtues,	then	his	account	of	virtues	relies	on	a	prior	notion	of	right	and	could,	therefore,	not	count	as	a	virtue	ethics.	If,	however,	doing	the	(independently)	right	thing	is	 not	 built	 into	 the	 account	 of	 virtue,	 then	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 the	 definition	 of	happiness	 yields	 the	 virtues	 as	 Aristotle	 understands	 them,	 as	 opposed	 to,	 say,	Calliclean	virtues.	Broadie	2007:	115	develops	the	point	beautifully.	17	Frede	2014	offers	a	nice	discussion	of	this	problem.	18	See	Gottlieb	2009:	77	for	further	discussion.	
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4.	PRIORITY	IN	2.6:	ARISTOTLE'S	DEFINITION	OF	VIRTUE	Aristotle	begins	defining	 the	genus	of	virtue	 in	chapter	2.5	as	a	 state	 (hexis)	of	character.	Having	discussed	the	differentia	in	2.6,	he	defines	virtue	as	‘a	character	state	in	the	middle	relative	to	us	issuing	in	decision,	the	middle	being	determined	by	reason,	namely	 reason	 by	 which	 the	 wise	 person	 would	 determine	 it’	 (1106b36-1107a2).	Although	 the	 term	 ‘issuing	 in	 decision’	 (proairetikē)	 points	 forward	 to	 the	 full	discussion	 of	 decision	 in	 3.2-4,	 it	 also	 points	 backward	 to	 the	 theme	 of	 motive:	 a	virtuous	 person	 decides	 on	 the	 just	 and	 moderate	 things	 for	 their	 own	 sakes	 (cf.	2.4.1105b28-32).	What	we	 choose	 to	do,	 and	how	we	do	 it,	 depends	 centrally	 on	our	emotional	response	to	the	situation:	many	of	our	actions	are,	 if	not	prompted,	 then	at	least	 informed	 by	 various	 forms	 of	 pleasant	 or	 distressing	 emotions	 such	 as	 fear,	boldness,	 desire,	 anger	 and	 pity	 (cf.	 2.5.1105b21-3)	—	 all	 of	which	 can	 be	 excessive,	deficient,	 or	 in	 the	 middle	 (2.6.1106b18-20).	 The	 associated	 actions	 will	 likewise	 be	excessive,	deficient,	or	in	the	middle	(b23-4).	A	decision	issued	by	virtue	will	therefore	involve	neither	excessive	nor	deficient	emotional	or	practical	responses.		How	are	we	to	understand	‘excessive’,	‘deficient’	and	‘middle’?	Aristotle	appears	to	offer	two	answers:	virtue	is	‘a	middle	state	between	two	bad	states,	one	of	deficiency,	and	the	other	of	excess,	and	also	because	…	virtue	both	finds	and	chooses	the	middle	in	affections	 and	 actions’	 (2.6.1107a2-6).	 The	 question	 whether	 Aristotle	 is	 a	 virtue	ethicist	invites	us	to	probe	the	relation	between	virtue	as	a	middle	state	and	the	middle	response.	Is	virtue	a	middle	state	primarily	because	it	issues	in	middle	responses,	or	are	the	 responses	 issued	 by	 virtue	 in	 the	middle	 primarily	 because	 they	 are	 issued	 by	 a	state	which	 is	 independently	 a	middle	 state?	According	 to	 the	 response-first	 reading,	virtue	 as	 middle	 state	 derives	 from	 the	 prior	 and	 independent	 notion	 of	 the	 middle	response;	according	to	the	state-first	reading,	responses	count	as	middle	only	insofar	as	they	stem	from	a	middle	state.	I	begin	with	the	state-first	reading.		4.1	Priority	of	the	state		According	 to	 the	 state-first	 reading,	 we	 can	 explain	 ‘excessive’,	 ‘deficient’	 and	‘middle’	only	through	the	states	issuing	the	response.	Aristotle	introduces	the	triad	on	the	 back	 of	 the	 equal,	 the	 larger	 and	 the	 smaller	 on	 a	 continuous	 and	 divisible	 scale	(2.6.1106a26-9).	If	we	follow	Aristotle	in	focusing	on	the	emotional	response	and	take	our	 cue	 from	 the	quantitative	 terms,	we	may	 take	Aristotle	 to	 suggest	 that	 emotional	responses	 are	 right	 (and	 wrong)	 whenever	 they	 hit	 (or	 miss)	 the	 middle	 on	 a	continuous	 and	 divisible	 scale	 of	 quantities	 (1106b24-7).	 For	 instance,	 one’s	 anger	might	arise	too	late,	be	too	intense,	be	held	for	too	long	etc.	But,	according	to	the	state-first	 reading,	 as	 soon	 as	 we	 start	 considering	 more	 complex	 situations,	 we	 face	 a	difficulty.	Suppose	you	are	angry	because	you	have	received	a	flagrantly	insulting	email	from	a	student.	Your	anger	 flares	up,	but	on	closer	examination,	 the	student	seems	to	suffer	 from	 a	 serious	 mental	 illness	 —	 in	 which	 case	 the	 anger	 should	 subside	immediately:	 in	 view	 of	 the	 full	 picture	 anger	 ceases	 to	 be	 appropriate.	 While	 the	example	 shows	why	Aristotle	 rejects	 the	 arithmetical	middle	 (cf.	 1106a29-b5)	—	 the	
Penultimate Draft. Citable version in Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 
ed. Verity Harte and Raphael Woolf (in press, Cambridge UP). 
 8 
right	and	middle	response	does	not	always	lie	in	the	middle	between	too	little	(say	zero	anger)	and	too	much	(extreme	rage)	—	it	also	raises	the	general	question	why	Aristotle	thinks	 the	 right	 response	 should	 have	 anything	 to	 do	with	 the	middle.	Why,	 in	 other	words,	 does	 he	 subscribe	 to	 any	 ‘doctrine	 of	 the	mean’	 rather	 than	 a	 ‘doctrine	 of	 the	right	and	appropriate’?19		Aristotle’s	 earlier	 discussion	 in	 2.5	 prepares	 the	 answer:	 the	 emotional	responses	 stem	 from	certain	 capacities	which	 tend	 to	develop	 into	 states	 ‘in	virtue	of	which	we	 are	 in	 a	 good	 or	 bad	 condition	with	 respect	 to	 the	 emotions’	 (1105b25-7).	Excellent	 character	 states,	 virtues,	 prompt	 us	 reliably	 to	 respond	 well;	 defects	 of	character	prompt	us	not	 to	 respond	well.	But	 the	 incorrect	 responses	 form	a	pattern:	one	 person	 tends	 towards	 deficient	 responses,	 another	 towards	 excessive	 ones.	Aristotle	 therefore	postulates	 corresponding	 states	of	 character	 issuing	 excessive	 and	deficient	responses	respectively:	each	individual	virtue	lies	between	an	excessive	and	a	deficient	state.	We	can	then	evaluate	an	emotional	or	practical	response	as	lying	in	the	middle	relative	to	us	by	reference	to	the	issuing	state:	an	individual	response	lies	in	the	middle	 insofar	 as	 it	 stems	 from	 and	 expresses	 a	 middle	 state.20	 Returning	 to	 the	example,	 responding	 with	 zero	 anger	 lies	 in	 the	 middle	 insofar	 as	 it	 expresses	 the	middle	 state	 called	 ‘good	 temper’,	 a	 state	 between	 irascibility	 and	 “unanger”	(apparently	of	Aristotle’s	coinage,	2.7.1108a4-9).	Although	the	unangered	and	the	good-tempered	person	alike	respond	with	zero	anger,	the	former	fails	to	hit	the	middle:	not	because	she	does	so	for	the	wrong	reasons	(she	may	or	may	not),	but	because	she	never	exhibits	anger,	i.e.	she	fails	on	the	score	of	frequency,	a	difference	hard	to	account	for	by	concentrating	on	individual	actions	rather	than	character.	Thus,	according	to	the	state-first	 reading,	 assigning	 primacy	 to	 character	 over	 the	 response	 accounts	 for	 and	explains	Aristotle’s	‘doctrine	of	the	mean’.		4.2	Priority	of	the	response	Read	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 however,	 the	 text	 draws	 a	 different	 picture:	 far	 from	assigning	priority	to	the	state	over	the	response	in	emotion	or	action,	Aristotle	derives	the	 definition	 of	 virtue	 from	 a	 prior	 notion	 of	 the	middle	 response.	He	 begins	with	 a	general	 point	 about	 excellence:	 anything	 capable	 of	 excellence	 will	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	excellence	a)	be	in	a	good	condition	and	b)	accomplish	its	work	well	(1106a15-17).21	By	introducing	 two	 very	 different	 examples	 —	 the	 excellence	 of	 eyes	 and	 horses	 —	Aristotle	 supports	 the	 general	 application	 of	 a)	 and	 b)	 (a21-2),	 including	 to	 human	beings	 as	 such:	 ‘the	 virtue	 of	 a	 human	 being	 is	 the	 state	 of	 character	 on	 which	 her	goodness	 depends	 and	 as	 a	 result	 of	 which	 she	 will	 accomplish	 her	 work	 well’	
                                                       19	 Both	 Hursthouse	 2006	 and	 Brown	 2013	 urge	 Aristotle	 to	 give	 up	 speaking	 of	 the	middle.	20	Cf.	Urmson	1980.	Broadie	1991:	97-102	explores	this	interpretation	in	greater	detail.	21	 I	 reserve	 ‘virtue’	 for	 excellence	 of	 character;	 in	 all	 other	 cases,	 I	 render	 aretē	 as	‘excellence’.	 ‘Work’	 renders	 ergon,	 a	 concept	 wide	 enough	 to	 capture	 both	 separable	products	such	as	houses	or	shoes	and	self-contained	activities	such	as	seeing.	
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(1106a22-4).	 Turning	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 excellence,	 he	 seeks	 to	 elucidate	 further	 how	excellence	 relates	 to	 being	 in	 a	 good	 condition	 and	 accomplishing	 one’s	 work	 well.	Aristotle	 begins	 his	 argument	 by	 explaining	 the	 success	 conditions	 for	 accomplishing	one’s	work	well.	 Distinguishing	 the	 arithmetical	mean	 from	 the	middle	 relative	 to	 us	(1106a29-36),	Aristotle	observes	that	experts,	avoiding	excess	and	deficiency,	seek	out	and	choose	the	middle	relative	to	us	(1106a36-b7)	and	thereby	accomplish	their	work	well.	 Good	 works	 lie	 in	 the	 middle	 between	 excess	 and	 deficiency:	 adding	 or	 taking	away	 anything	 would	 worsen	 them	 (2.6.1106b5-14).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 craft,	 expertise	(epistēmē)	explains	the	expert’s	reliably	hitting	the	middle	because,	strictly	speaking,	it	looks	 towards	 the	 middle	 and	 guides	 the	 works	 (erga)	 towards	 it	 (b8-10).	 The	craftsperson’s	excellence	thus	consists	in	aiming	at	and	hitting	the	middle	relative	to	us.		Aristotle	 takes	 himself	 to	 have	 discovered	 a	 general	 feature	 of	 excellence	involving	 reason:	 aiming	 at	 and	 hitting	 the	 middle	 explains	 the	 craftsperson’s	accomplishing	 her	 ergon	 well.	 Consequently,	 human	 excellence,	 virtue	 of	 character,	should	 aim	 at	 and	 hit	 the	 middle	 too	 (2.6.1106b14-16),	 which	 Aristotle	 hastens	 to	confirm.	By	giving	a	 few	examples	of	 emotional	 responses	 (getting	angry,	 feeling	 fear	etc,	b18-24),	Aristotle	drives	home	the	point	that	emotional	and	practical	responses	can	hit	or	miss	the	middle	and	are	praiseworthy	and	right	(both	marks	of	virtue)	when	they	lie	 in	 the	middle	relative	 to	us.22	Human	excellence,	Aristotle	concludes,	has	 the	same	structure	as	craft:	‘virtue	is	a	kind	of	middle	state,	at	least	insofar	as	(ge)	it	is	effective	at	hitting	the	middle’	(b27-8).	After	showing	how	the	conclusion	coheres	with	things	said	about	going	wrong	and	getting	it	right,	Aristotle	defines	virtue	as	a	character	state	in	the	middle	 relative	 to	 us	 issuing	 in	 decision.	 Thus,	 contrary	 to	 the	 state-first	 reading,	Aristotle	 does	 not	 start	 out	with	 excessive	 and	deficient	 states	 (crafts	 are	 not	middle	states)	but	rather	defines	excellence	in	general	as	a	state	hitting	the	middle	via	analogy	to	craft.	The	response-first	reading	stresses	that	Aristotle	relies	heavily	on	the	notion	of	middle	response	which	he	so	laboriously	introduces	through	the	analogy	to	explain	the	role	of	virtue	in	accomplishing	the	human	ergon	well.23	According	to	the	response-first	reading,	Aristotle	does	not	merely	illustrate	the	middle	through	craft,	but	rather	derives	the	definition	of	virtue	from	the	prior	notion	of	a	middle	and	right	response.		4.3	The	return	of	the	question	Aristotle’s	 definition	 of	 virtue	 confirms	 the	 response-first	 reading:	 ‘virtue	 is	 a	state	 in	 the	middle	 relative	 to	us	 issuing	 in	decision,	 the	middle	being	determined	by	reason,	 namely	 reason	 by	 which	 the	 wise	 person	 would	 determine	 it’	 (1106b36-
                                                       22	Before	setting	it	aside,	I	should	perhaps	say	that	I	agree	with	Brown	2013:	69	n.8	on	the	middle	‘relative	to	us’:	an	action	or	emotion	is	in	the	middle	relative	to	us	if	and	only	if	 it	 responds	 properly	 to	 the	 relevant	 human	 concerns	 which	 the	 particulars	 of	 the	situation	 present.	 Human	 nature	 obviously	 constrains	 (reasonable)	 human	 concerns,	but	does	not	determine	them.	23	 Brown	 2013:	 70-1	 discusses	 this	 point	 more	 fully.	 Her	 whole	 article	 defends	 the	reading	outlined	in	this	paragraph	convincingly.	
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1107a2).	Aristotle,	as	we	have	seen,	argues	for	virtue	as	a	middle	state	by	reference	to	craft	 in	2.6;	 the	qualification	 ‘middle	 relative	 to	us’	 simply	 transfers	 from	response	 to	state,	 as	 does	 its	 being	 determined	 by	 reason	 (logos,	 anticipated	 in	 2.2).	 Now,	 the	elucidation	of	reason	as	 ‘reason	by	which	the	wise	person	would	determine	it’	 further	supports	 the	 response-first	 reading:	 the	 wise	 person’s	 reason	 hardly	 determines	 the	middle	state	(although	grammatically	the	Greek	says	that)	—	except	 indirectly	via	the	middle	response.	The	wise	person	does	not	or	would	not	first	determine	a	certain	state	whose	 responses	 count	 as	 middle	 in	 virtue	 of	 stemming	 from	 that	 state;	 rather	 she	would	determine	the	right	responses	such	a	state	must	issue	when	activated,	and	would	thereby	indirectly	determine	the	state.		Aristotle’s	 exposition	 points	 towards	 the	 priority	 of	middle	 action	 over	 virtue,	but	the	reference	to	the	wise	person	forestalls	that	conclusion.	Since	Aristotle	does	not	believe	that	we	can	know	what	is	the	right	thing	to	do	in	a	particular	situation	until	we	ourselves	are	immersed	in	the	situation	(or	if	we	follow	an	authority,	the	authority	must	be	 immersed),	 he	 can	 only	 say	 in	 a	 general	 way	 what	 the	 particular	 right	 action	 is,	namely	a	hitting	of	the	middle	(2.2).	But	what	counts	as	middle	in	a	particular	situation	is	what	 the	wise	person	would	determine	as	 the	middle.	Therefore,	 the	response-first	reading	 as	 specified	 so	 far	 does	 not	 settle	 the	 priority	 of	 ethically	 good	 action	 over	virtue:	that	question	requires	examining	how	the	wise	and	virtuous	person	determines	the	middle.24	 Should	 the	middle	 depend	 conceptually	 or	 in	 existence	 in	 some	way	on	virtue	or	 the	virtuous	and	wise	person,	 then	virtue-notions	would	again	have	priority	over	ethically	good	action.	Take	the	state-first	reading:	a	response	hits	the	middle	only	insofar	as	it	stems	from	and	expresses	a	middle	state.	The	middle	response	—	the	right	thing	to	feel	or	do	—	would	not	be	independent	of	virtue;	virtue	would	determine	the	middle	response	not	merely	by	enabling	 its	possessor	to	take	good	aim,	but	rather	by	being	 constitutive	 of	 what	 counts	 as	 the	 goal	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 response-first	reading	denies	the	last	step	by	pointing	to	the	analogy	between	virtue	and	expertise	in	craft.	While	the	expert	uses	reason	encapsulated	in	her	expertise	to	determine	the	right	or	middle	response	 to	 the	situation,	what	counts	as	middle	 in	 the	 first	place	does	not	depend	 on	 the	 expert’s	 reason:	 generally	we	 can	 specify	 good	 craft	 products	without	reference	 to	 the	 expert.	 If	 virtue	 resembles	 craft,	 then	 virtue,	 just	 like	 any	 other	expertise,	 causes	 the	 virtuous	 person	 to	 hit	 the	 middle,	 thereby	 producing	 an	independently	specifiable	good	outcome.		To	 sum	 up,	 Aristotle’s	 definition	 of	 virtue	 and	 the	 surrounding	 discussion	 in	Book	2	leaves	open	the	question	whether	Aristotle	is	a	virtue	ethicist:	like	craft,	virtue	is	a	middle	state	insofar	as	it	hits	the	middle,	and	unlike	craft,	it	is	a	middle	state	insofar	as	it	 lies	 between	 two	 vices.	 When	 Aristotle	 proleptically	 refers	 to	 the	 wise	 person,	 he	
                                                       24	Interestingly,	Brown	2013:	70	sets	aside	the	reference	to	reason	—	as	if	irrelevant	for	the	question	whether	Aristotle	is	a	virtue	ethicist	(to	which	she	turns	in	the	last	part	of	her	paper).	 	Rapp	2006:	111-2	on	 the	other	hand	 thinks	 the	addition	starkly	opposes	Aristotle’s	position	to	deontology	and	consequentialism.	
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raises	 the	question	whether	 the	middle	at	which	virtue	aims	depends	 in	some	deeper	way	on	the	wise	and	virtuous	person.	While	Aristotle	does	not	address	the	question	of	priority	 head-on	 in	 Book	 2	 (the	 puzzle	 in	 2.4	 concerns	 temporal	 priority),	 he	nevertheless	offers	some	material	elsewhere,	in	Books	6	and	notably	3,	which	helps	us	answer	the	question.		5.	PRIORITY	IN	3.4:	THE	GOOD	MAN	AS	MEASURE	What	 role	 does	 the	 good	 and	 wise	 person’s	 reason	 play	 in	 determining	 the	middle?	Aristotle	turns	to	elucidating	virtue,	a	 ‘state	issuing	in	decision’,	by	discussing	agency	in	general	and	decision	and	its	elements	in	particular	in	Book	3.	He	begins	with	decision	and	deliberation,	the	elements	of	action	forwarding	the	goal	(cf.	1113a12-14)	and	only	then	turns	to	explaining	both	what	action	aims	at	and	how	the	particular	goal	enters	the	agent’s	deliberation	(3.4).25	Aristotle	no	doubt	assigns	a	crucial	role	to	virtue	in	deciding	on	an	action:	to	perform	a	virtuous	action	virtuously	an	agent	must	decide	on	the	action	 for	 its	own	sake	—	which	tends	to	require	a	 firm	state	built	up	through	habituation	 (2.4.1105a31-b5).	 Thus,	 her	 state	 of	 character	 informs	 how	 the	 agent	pursues	the	goal:	virtue	seems	necessary	for	pursuing	the	goal	in	the	virtuous	way.	But	does	 the	 state	 of	 character	 likewise	 inform	what	 the	 agent	 pursues	 as	 goal	when	 she	pursues	 a	 particular	 goal?	 Aristotle	 examines	 the	 goal’s	 independence	 from	 the	 good	and	virtuous	person	in	3.4.26		5.1	The	object	of	wish:	three	proposals	Aristotle	 develops	 his	 stance	 towards	 the	 goal	 of	 particular	 actions	 only	 in	contrast	to	two	other	foils,	with	which	we	must	start.	He	anchors	the	discussion	on	wish	and	its	object:	since	‘wish	is	for	the	goal’	(1113a15),	he	focuses	on	identifying	the	object	of	wish	 (or	what	 is	wished	 for,	boulēton).	One	group	postulates	 the	 good	as	object	 of	wish,	 another	 group	 the	 apparent	 good	 (a16).	 Both	 proposals	 hit	 truth	 only	 partly.	Aristotle	 takes	 the	 first	 proposal	 to	 be	 unduly	 restrictive.	 Suppose	 an	 agent	 can	wish	only	 for	what	 is	good.	 If	 she	chooses	what	 is	 in	 fact	not	good,	 she	 fails	 to	wish	 for	an	object	of	wish	—	which,	implausibly,	rules	out	mistaken	wishing.27	The	second	proposal,	by	 contrast,	 falls	 short	 by	 being	 too	 permissive.	 If	 appearing	 good	 to	 an	 agent	 just	 is	being	an	object	of	wish,	two	opposing	objects	can	share	the	status	of	being	wished	for	if	
                                                       25	See	Frede	2015	for	helpful	discussion	of	Aristotle’s	back-to-front	order	of	exposition.	26	 Although	 Aristotle	 identifies	 the	 excellence	 associated	 with	 hitting	 the	 middle	 in	action,	 i.e.	 responding	 in	accordance	with	right	reason,	as	wisdom	(phronēsis),	Book	6	does	not	much	illuminate	the	question	whether	the	standard	or	aim	(skopos,	1138b22)	is	prior	or	posterior	 to	 the	good	person	and	her	wisdom	(cf.	Taylor	2006:	108-10).	 If	Book	6	 is	properly	 integrated	 in	 the	EN,	 then	Aristotle	 can	 regard	 the	question	about	independence	 of	 the	 goal	 as	 settled	 in	 3.4	—	 hence	my	 focus.	 Obviously,	 the	 role	 of	wisdom	 in	 Book	 6	would	 need	 to	 be	 part	 of	 an	 exhaustive	 study	 of	 Aristotle’s	 virtue	ethical	credentials;	I	will	return	briefly	to	it	in	my	conclusion.	27	As	 Socrates	 puts	 it	 in	 the	Gorgias,	 if	 a	 person	 fails	 to	 do	what	 is	 actually	 good	 [for	him],	he	does	not	do	what	he	wants	(468d).	
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they	 appear	 good	 to	 different	 agents.	 Thus,	 whether	 X	 is	 an	 object	 of	 wish	 does	 not	depend	on	its	nature,	but	merely	on	whether	an	agent	actually	wishes	for	it	(a20-2)	—	which,	 again,	 rules	 out	 mistaken	 wishing	 (supposing	 the	 agent	 cannot	 be	 mistaken	about	what	appears	good	to	her).	While	both	proposals	account	for	the	Greek	boulēton,	they	do	not	satisfy	because	each	focuses	on	one	aspect	only.	The	first	focuses	entirely	on	tying	the	status	of	X	as	object	of	wish	to	X’s	being	good,	 i.e.	on	what	 is	wish-able,	and	neglects	the	agent’s	wishing,	whereas	the	second	starts	from	the	agent’s	wishing	for	X	—	X’s	appearing	good	to	an	agent	—	and	denies	that	there	is	more	to	being	an	object	of	wish.	 	Aristotle	seeks	to	integrate	the	fortes	of	each	into	his	own	more	comprehensive	account:	 the	 insight	 that	 each	 person	wishes	 for	what	 appears	 good	 to	 her,	 and	 that	being	an	object	of	wish	does	not	reduce	to	being	wished	for	by	just	anyone,	i.e.	that	the	nature	of	 the	object	of	wish	must	be	 taken	 into	account.	Aristotle	proposes	 to	restrict	the	unqualified	and	true	object	of	wish	to	what	is	good	(1113a22-4);	everything	else	can	only	serve	as	qualified	object	of	wish:	what	is	good	is	without	qualification	to	be	wished	for	(yet	another	nuance	of	boulêton)	—	which	becomes	the	agent’s	object	of	wish	when	it	seems	good	to	her.	Since	what	is	good	must	appear	good	to	the	prospective	agent	if	she	 is	 to	 deliberate	 and	 act	 well,	 the	 object	 of	 wish	 and	 the	 object	 of	 wish	 without	qualification	 coincide	 for	 the	 good	 person	 (a25).	 But	 does	 the	 alignment	 happen	because	 the	 good	 person	 recognises	 an	 independent	 good,	 or	 because	 her	 decision-making	determines	what	is	good?		5.2	The	object	of	wish:	two	measures	While	the	agent’s	wishing	for	a	certain	goal	obviously	depends	on	the	agent,	it	is	a	 real	question	whether	 its	normative	 status	does	 so	 too.	Which	standard	determines	whether	 something	 is	 worth	 wishing	 for	 without	 qualification?	 By	 alluding	 to	Protagoras’	famous	homo	mensura	thesis	(‘man	is	the	measure	of	all	things	…’	DK	80	B1)	Aristotle	may	indicate	that	he	develops	a	response-dependent	account	of	the	object	of	wish	according	 to	which	 the	object	of	wish	without	qualification	depends	 importantly	on	 the	 good	 person’s	 response	 to	 it.	 Aristotle	 rejects	 the	 suggestion	 that	 whatever	seems	 good	 to	 any	 given	 person	 is	 good	 (without	 qualification)	 by	 driving	 a	 wedge	between	an	object’s	appearing	good	and	an	object’s	being	good:	what	appears	good	to	the	 bad	 person	 is	 fortuitous	 (1113a26)	 and	 not	 automatically	 good.	 According	 to	Aristotle,	 one	 can	 make	 mistaken	 choices	 by	 wishing	 for	 what	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 good	because	an	object’s	goodness	outstrips	its	appearing	good	to	just	any	person.	But	how?	In	 response	 to	 Protagoras,	 Aristotle	 likens	 the	 good	 person	 to	 ‘a	 carpenter’s	 rule	(kanōn)	or	measure	(metron)	 for	every	case’	(a32-33).	Aristotle	here	seems	to	correct	Protagoras	on	the	object	of	wish	by	replacing	‘whatever	seems	good	to	any	given	person	
is	good	(without	qualification)’	with	 ‘whatever	seems	good	to	the	good	person	 is	good	(without	qualification)’,	 suggesting	 that	an	object	 is	 to	be	wished	 for	because	 it	 seems	
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good	to	the	good	person.28	Aristotle	could	thus	explain	well	why	the	object	of	wish	and	the	object	of	wish	without	qualification	coincide	for	the	good	person	(a25):	for	the	goal	of	an	action	to	be	good	just	is	for	it	to	appear	good	to	her	—	which	would	indeed	make	the	good	person	the	measure	of	what	is	good	in	action.		The	 good	 person	 will	 be	 a	 measure	 in	 a	 different	 way,	 if	 Aristotle	 rejects	 the	Protagorean	 approach	more	 fully	 by	 denying	 that	 the	 good	person’s	 judgement	 plays	any	 special	 role	 in	 X’s	 being	 the	 unqualifiedly	 good	 thing	 to	 do.	 In	 particular,	 if	 the	nature	of	the	object	can	be	specified	independently	of	anyone’s	attitude	towards	it,	the	link	between	appearing	good	to	the	good	person	and	being	good	without	qualification	no	 longer	exists	by	 fiat.	 If	 the	unqualified	object	of	wish	 is	 thus	 independent	 from	the	good	 person’s	 responses,	 she	 would	 rather	 characteristically	 detect	 what	 is	 good	independently	 of	 her	 judgement:	 what	 is	 good	without	 qualification	 appears	 good	 to	her.	The	good	person’s	response	would	thus	be	measured	in	the	sense	that	it	measures	up	to	reality	—	a	reality	independent	of	at	least	her	responses.	The	good	person	would	thus	 be	 a	 measure	 in	 correctly	 discerning	 what	 is	 good	 because	 her	 responses	 are	characteristically	 appropriate,	 i.e.	measured	 to	 any	 given	 situation	 (cf.	Met.	 1053a31-b4).	 	5.3	Aristotle	against	response-dependence	In	which	sense	is	the	good	person	a	measure?	If	Aristotle	develops	the	response-dependent	position	as	sketched,	the	good	person’s	object	of	wish	would	be	what	is	to	be	wished	 for	 without	 qualification	 in	 virtue	 of	 appearing	 good	 to	 her	 or	 to	 any	 good	person	 similarly	 well	 placed.	 The	 structure	 of	 the	 text	 may	 seem	 to	 support	 such	 a	reading:	 at	 1113a25-6	Aristotle	maintains	 that	 ‘for/to	 the	 good	person	<the	object	 of	wish>	is	the	true	object	of	wish;	for/to	the	bad	person	a	chance	object’.29	Supporting	the	primacy	of	the	person	in	a	good	state	with	two	examples,	Aristotle	explains	the	role	of	appearance:	‘for	(gar)	the	good	person	judges	each	case	correctly,	i.e.	the	truth	appears	to	him	in	all	cases’	(a30-1).	Now,	if	the	truth	concerning	the	true	object	of	wish	appears	to	the	good	person	and	this	appearance	explains	why	the	true	object	of	wish	is	the	true	object	of	wish	not	only	to	her,	but	also	for	her,	then	what	is	good	for	her	is	good	because	it	 appears	 so	 to	 her.	 If	 the	 good	 person’s	 responses	 provide	 the	measure,	 then	what	appears	to	the	good	person	would	be	true	in	virtue	of	its	appearing	so	to	her.		
                                                       28	 For	 the	 sake	of	 brevity,	 I	write	 as	 if	 an	object’s	being	 to	be	wished	 for	depends	on	actual	responses.	However,	the	good	person	could	also	be	the	measure	if	the	unqualified	object	of	wish	conceptually	depends	on	the	good	person:	X	is	to	be	wished	for	without	qualification	 if	X	 is	 such	 that	 the	good	person	would	choose	 it.	Aristotle	distinguishes	between	priority	in	being	and	in	account	in	Met.	9.8.	29	I	render	the	datives	in	the	Greek	as	‘for/to’	because	on	the	present	proposal,	there	is	no	real	difference	between	 ‘X	appears	good	to	the	good	person’	and	 ‘X	 is	good	for	 the	good	person’.		Further	on	this	point,	Gottlieb	1991:	30-1.	
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The	details,	 however,	 provide	 a	 stumbling	block	 for	 this	 reading.	 In	particular,	the	 examples	 illustrating	 Aristotle’s	 claim	 at	 1113a25-6	 tell	 against	 any	 kind	 of	response-dependence.	 First,	 ‘just	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 body,	 for	 those	 in	 a	 good	condition,	 healthy	 are	 things	 that	 are	 truly	 such	 <sc.	 healthy>,	 but	 for	 sick	 people	different	 things…’	 (1113b26-8).	 While	 Aristotle	 undoubtedly	 holds	 up	 the	 healthy	person	 as	 paradigm	 and	 reference	 point	 for	 the	 extension	 of	 ‘healthy	 without	qualification’,	he	does	not	attach	any	 further	 importance	 to	 the	role	of	appearance,	as	would	be	required.	Even	if	‘X	appears	healthy	to	the	person	in	good	condition’	implies	‘X	is	 healthy	 for	 her’,30	 the	 further	 claim	 that	 ‘X	 appears	 healthy	 to	 the	 person	 in	 good	condition’	 just	 is	 ‘X	 is	 healthy	 for	 her’	 finds	 no	 support	 in	 Aristotle.	 If	 we	 ask	why	 a	certain	 food	 is	 healthy,	 the	 answer	 usually	makes	 no	 reference	 to	 how	 it	 appears	 to	anyone;	the	answer	makes	reference	to	the	organs	whose	well-functioning	constitutes	health.31	So,	while	healthy	things	appear	healthy	to	the	healthy,	we	cannot	say	that	an	object’s	appearing	healthy	to	someone,	even	the	good	person,	 just	 is	 its	being	healthy:	health	is	not	a	response-dependent	concept.		If	the	first	example	tells	against	response-dependence,	so	does	the	second	one	—	at	 least	 Aristotle	 intends	 them	 to	 work	 alike:	 ‘…	 and	 likewise	 (homoiōs)	 with	 bitter,	sweet,	 hot,	 heavy	 and	 all	 other	 things’	 (1113a28-9,	 quote	 continued).	 For	 those	 in	 a	good	 condition,	 things	 are	 bitter,	 sweet,	 hot,	 or	 heavy	 which	 really	 are	 bitter	 etc,	whereas	those	in	a	bad	condition	may	get	things	wrong.	However	plausible	a	response-dependent	 construal	 of	 those	 qualities	 e.g.	 via	 competent	 observes	 under	 normal	conditions	may	 seem	 to	 us	 nowadays,	 if	 qualities	 Q	 such	 as	 bitter,	 sweet	 etc	 are	 like	health,	then	Aristotle	denies	that	‘X	appears	Q	to	the	person	in	good	condition’	just	is	‘X	is	Q	 for	her’:	 there	 is	more	 to	being	Q	 for	 a	 good	person	 than	 its	 appearing	Q	 to	her.	Support	for	a	response-independent	construal	of	sweet,	bitter,	etc	abounds	outside	the	
Ethics.	All	the	qualities	mentioned	are	embedded	in	Aristotelian	scientific	theories:	they	are	what	they	are	 in	virtue	of	 their	explanatory	role,	not	 in	virtue	of	our	responses	to	them.32	 The	 scientific	 understanding	 of	 the	 qualities	 thus	 drives	 a	 wedge	 between	
                                                       30	 Being	 attracted	 by	 the	 right	 kind	 of	 food	 belongs	 to	 physical	 well-functioning	 and	being	 in	 a	 good	 bodily	 condition	 (cf.	 9.5.1176a3-9),	 whereas	 being	 in	 a	 bad	 bodily	condition	does	not	align	what	is	attractive	to	the	person	and	what	is	good	and	healthy	for	her	(cf.	7.14.1154a22-b15).	31	 Hist.	 An.	 10.1.633b16-23	 and	 Phys.	 6.1.224a25-6.	 Elsewhere,	 Aristotle	 describes	health	 as	 ‘consisting	 in	 a	 blending	 of	 hot	 and	 cold	 elements	 in	 due	 proportion,	 in	relation	either	to	one	another	within	the	body	or	to	the	surrounding’	(Phys.	7.3.246b4-6;	cf.	DA	1.4).	32	For	instance,	an	object’s	being	heavy	explains	why	it	moves	to	the	bottom	or	towards	the	centre	of	the	universe	(DC	4.4);	it	would	be	absurd	if	the	object	were	heavy	because	it	 appears	 so	 to	 a	 good	 judge.	 The	 other	 examples	 do	 not	 fare	 better:	 heat’s	 role	 in	constituting	the	four	elements	(GC	2.3.330a30ff.)	and	in	digestion	(DA	2.4.416b28)	leave	no	 room	 for	 response-dependence.	 Heat,	 in	 fact,	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 sweetness	 and	bitterness:	 heat	 causes	 concoction	 (pepsis),	 a	 chemical	 process	 key	 to	 both	 digestion	(food	 has	 to	 be	 concocted	 to	 nutriment)	 and	 reproduction	 (semen	 and	 menses	 are	
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appearing	Q	 and	 being	Q	 (even	 for	 someone):	what	 is	 sweet,	warm,	 bitter	 and	 heavy	without	qualification	is	determined	by	the	scientific	theory.	Just	as	in	the	case	of	health	and	 partly	 for	 the	 same	 reasons	—	 digestion	 and	 warmth	 are	 key	 to	 health	 (cf.	 EN	10.5.1176a12-15)	—	the	person	 in	a	good	condition	will	discern	correctly	how	things	really	are.33		5.4	The	independence	of	the	object	of	wish:	Aristotle’s	recognitionalism	Aristotle’s	use	of	the	two	examples	points	firmly	towards	response-independent	qualities:	if	what	appears	X	and	what	is	X	coincide	for	the	exemplary	perceiver,	neither	example	 indicates	 that	 the	 exemplar’s	 perceiving	 contributes	 anything	 important	 to	what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 X.	 Since	 the	 examples	 serve	 to	 illustrate	 the	 connection	 between	 the	unqualified	object	of	wish	and	the	good	person,	we	should	adopt	an	alternative	reading	which	does	not	make	the	unqualified	object	of	wish	dependent	on	the	good	person	via	appearance	or	 judgement.	Thus,	 there	 is	a	conceptual	difference	between	X’s	 seeming	good	to	the	good	person	and	X’s	being	good	for	her:	the	good	person	does	not	perceive	correctly	by	 fiat.	We	should,	 therefore,	not	 translate	 tō(i)	 spoudaiō(i)	 in	1113a25-6	as	‘for	 the	 good	 person’	 (as	 on	 the	 previous	 proposal),	 but	 as	 ‘to	 the	 good	 person	 <the	object	of	wish>	 is	 the	true	object	of	wish;	 to	the	bad	person	a	chance	object’.	 In	other	words,	 Aristotle	 seeks	 to	 explain	 in	 virtue	 of	 what	 the	 unqualified	 object	 of	 wish	appears	 good	 to	 the	 good	 person.	 So,	 Aristotle’s	 explanation	 that	 ‘the	 good	 person	discriminates	(krinei)	correctly	in	each	case,	and	in	each	case,	what	is	true	is	apparent	to	him’	 (1113a29-31)	means	what	 it	 appears	 to	mean:	what	 stands	 out	 about	 the	 good	person	 is	 ‘his	ability	 to	see	 (horan)	what’s	 true	 in	every	set	of	 circumstances’	 (a32-3)	where	 the	 truth	 is	 independent	 of	 the	 observer.	 And	 since	 this	 feature	 of	 the	 good	person	 prompts	 Aristotle	 to	 compare	 him	 to	 a	 carpenter’s	 rule	 (kanōn)	 or	 measure	(metron),	the	comparison	does	not	invite	any	form	of	response-dependence	on	the	good	person:	the	good	person’s	response	measures	up	to	how	things	really	are	independently	of	his	response.34		If	the	good	person’s	response	does	not	in	some	way	constitute	the	good	and	right	response,	 Aristotle	 not	 only	 avoids	 more	 general	 problems	 for	 a	 more	 thorough	response-dependent	 account	 of	 goodness	 (Does	 the	 good	 person’s	 goodness	 also	
                                                                                                                                                                            concocted	from	blood).	Aristotle	is	thus	led	to	think	that	everything	is	nurtured	by	what	is	 sweet	 (De	 Sensu	 442a2):	 this	 is	 what	 the	 body	 extracts	 from	 food	 stuffs,	 leaving	behind	only	bitter	waste	(Mete.	2.2.355b7;	cf.	Gen.	An.	4.8.776a28-9).	33	I	thank	Anthony	Price	for	helping	me	to	appreciate	Aristotle’s	position.	34	10.5.1176a18	 (virtue	and	 the	good	person	are	 the	measure)	 resembles	 the	present	account.	At	5.10.1137b29-33,	Aristotle	likens	the	decent	person	to	a	kanōn,	because	the	decent	 person	 corrects	 the	 deficiency	which	 law	 sometimes	 creates	when	 applied	 to	difficult	individual	cases.	Far	from	suggesting	the	decent	person’s	response	constitutes	what	is	right,	Aristotle	likens	her	to	the	leaden	kanōn	in	Lesbian	building	in	particular,	which	adapts	itself	to	the	stone,	as	if	the	decent	person	adapts	the	given	laws	well	to	the	situation.	
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depend	on	her	seeming	good	to	herself?),	but	also	provides	a	more	persuasive	account	of	 virtue.	 Since	 Aristotle	 effectively	 defines	 virtue	 as	 the	 state	 of	 character	 issuing	 in	middle	 responses,	 his	 definition	 of	 virtue	would	 be	 too	 narrowly	 circular	 if	 the	wise	person’s	 response	 constitutes	 the	middle,	 since	 having	wisdom	 requires	 full	 virtue	 of	character	 (6.13.1144b30-1145a6):	 virtue	 is	 the	 state	 that	 hits	 the	 middle	 and	 the	middle	 just	 is	 what	 the	 virtuous	 person	 perceives	 as	 middle.	 If,	 however,	 what	constitutes	 the	middle	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 the	wise	 and	 virtuous	 person’s	 response,	Aristotle’s	 account	 escapes	 at	 least	 that	 circle.	Of	 course,	 the	definition	of	 virtue	does	make	reference	to	the	wise	person,	but	if	we	accept	the	recognitionalist	reading	of	3.4,	the	 reference	 need	 not	 tie	 up	 Aristotle	 in	 a	 vicious	 circle.	 If	 the	 middle	 and	 right	response	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 good	 person’s	 response,	 Aristotle	 can,	 as	 he	 does,	make	 reference	 to	 the	 good	 and	 wise	 person	 to	 indicate	 the	 sort	 of	 reason	 used	 in	determining	 the	 middle	 in	 individual	 cases	 —	 without	 jeopardising	 his	 account	 of	virtue.35		To	conclude,	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	the	object	of	wish	supports	the	conception	of	virtue	developed	in	2.6	that	virtue	enables	its	possessor	to	accomplish	her	work	well	by	making	 the	 good	person	 reliably	 perceive	 the	 situation	 correctly:	 the	 good	person	perceives	the	situation	correctly	and	thus	reliably	recognises	the	unqualified	object	of	wish	 because	 virtue	 attunes	 its	 possessor	 to	what	 is	 fine	 (kalon)	 and	pleasant	 in	 any	given	situation.36	Non-virtuous	agents	succumb	especially	to	misleading	pleasures	(a33-b1),	which	makes	them	miss	the	middle	(1104b21-3;	cf.	EE	2.10	ad	fin.).	The	reference	to	the	wise	person	in	the	definition	of	virtue	in	2.6	should	not	be	read	as	indicating	that	the	middle	 depends	 on	 the	wise	 and	 good	 person’s	 responses	 as	 outlined	 above:	 the	wise	person’s	judgement	does	not	constitute	the	middle;	it	hits	the	middle.37		6.	CONCLUSION	The	value	of	addressing	the	question	whether	Aristotle	is	a	virtue	ethicist	lies	in	the	 new	 perspectives	 we	 gain.	 Having	 framed	 the	 question	 in	 terms	 congenial	 to	Aristotle’s	 framework	—	 whether	 excellent	 states	 of	 character	 are	 prior	 to	 ethically	good	action	—	we	found	Aristotle’s	closest	equivalent	to	be	a	question	about	middles:	is	
                                                       35	Aristotle	would	be	caught	in	an	epistemological	circle	if	he	made	recognising	the	truth	in	 a	 particular	 practical	 situation	 the	 prerogative	 of	 virtue.	 But	 clearly,	 many	 non-virtuous	people	know	that	 they	should	pay	back	 the	money	 they	borrowed,	 to	whom,	when	etc.	36	Virtue	further	contributes	to	making	the	right	decision	insofar	as	it	aligns	the	agent’s	desire	with	the	result	of	the	deliberation	for	the	end.	Virtue	thus	plays	a	crucial	role	in	motivating	the	agent	to	act	well.	37	Obviously	some	facts	about	the	good	person	are	features	of	the	situation.	For	instance	how	 much	 I	 should	 give	 out	 of	 generosity	 depends	 partly	 on	 my	 bank	 balance.	 But	Aristotle’s	discussion	does	not	support	the	stronger	thesis	that	an	action	is	to	be	wished	for	 because	 the	 virtuous	 person	 would	 wish	 for	 it.	 On	 the	 further	 question	 to	 what	extent	the	right	and	good	thing	to	do	depends	on	human	nature	(perhaps	exemplified	by	the	good	person	in	particular),	see	Charles	1995.	
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middle	action	prior	to	middle	states	of	character,	or	vice	versa?	Although	Aristotle	does	not	 explicitly	 advocate	 the	priority	 of	 action	over	 character	 in	 an	 account	 of	 ethically	good	action	when	defining	virtue	in	2.6,	in	the	context	of	comparing	Aristotle	to	virtue	ethicists	the	reference	to	the	wise	person	in	his	definition	of	virtue	nevertheless	raises	the	question	whether	the	appropriateness	of	response	somehow	depends	on	virtue	of	character.	While	Aristotle	counts	a	state	of	character	as	virtue	both	if	(i)	it	is	concerned	with	 deciding	 on	 middle	 responses	 and	 (ii)	 it	 lies	 between	 two	 vices,	 he	 winds	 up	assigning	 priority	 to	 (i)	 in	 3.4.	 He	 eschews	 any	 kind	 of	 response-dependence	 of	 the	object	of	wish	on	the	wise	and	good	person:	likening	the	object	of	wish	to	other	notions	which	he	clearly	considers	to	be	response-independent,	Aristotle	cannot	take	the	wise	person’s	 decision	 to	 constitute	 the	 ethically	 good	 thing	 to	 do.	 A	 practical	 response	 is	appropriate	 insofar	 as	 it	 gets	 the	 parameters	 right,	 where	 appropriateness	 does	 not	depend	 in	 any	 significant	way	 on	 the	 virtue:	 the	 good	 and	wise	 person	 decides	 on	 X	because	she	perceives	X	as	(independently)	to-be-done.		While	undermining	the	alleged	support	 for	Aristotle’s	virtue	ethical	credentials	through	a	close	reading	of	two	key	passages	falls	short	of	removing	Aristotle	from	the	Pantheon	of	virtue	ethics	for	good,	it	nevertheless	casts	doubt	on	Aristotle’s	status	as	a	sacred	cow	of	virtue	ethics	—	if	we	use	the	priority	of	virtue	over	ethically	good	action	as	 characteristic	 of	 virtue	 ethics.	 Not	 imputing	 virtue	 ethics	 to	 Aristotle	 has	 several	advantages.	 First,	 on	 the	 “local”	 level	 of	 the	 text,	 assuming	 a	 priori	 that	Aristotle	 is	 a	virtue	ethicist,	we	will	read	the	text	in	a	certain	way	that	conforms	to	the	“doctrine”	—	in	which	case	we	will	misread	two	central	passages,	on	the	definition	of	virtue	and	on	the	role	of	virtue	in	selecting	the	ethically	good	thing	to	do.	To	boot,	virtue	ethicists	tend	to	 disregard	 Aristotle’s	 commitment	 to	 theoretical	 contemplation	 (theōria).	 If	 good	character	were	 the	primary	notion	 in	Aristotle’s	 ethics,	we	would	be	hard-pressed	 to	explain	how	contemplation	can	find	a	place	in	the	best	life	at	all,	let	alone	why	Aristotle	extols	the	life	of	contemplation	over	the	life	of	the	merely	ethically	good	private	person	or	politician	(10.7-8).	Accommodating	Aristotle’s	focus	on	lives	(rather	than	individual	unconnected	 actions)	 does	 not	 require	 a	 virtue	 ethical	 framework.	 Happiness	 as	 the	highest	good	obviously	plays	the	key	role	in	Aristotle’s	ethics.	Since	virtuous	activity	is	central	to	happiness,	virtue	will	be	central	too	—	but	not	primary.	Although	Aristotle’s	exposition	 starts	 with	 happiness,	 on	 a	 theoretical	 level	 he	 builds	 up	 the	 notion	 of	happiness	from	more	basic	(and	better	known?)	notions:	from	independently	specified	good	action	(in	terms	of	the	middle)	he	defines	virtue,	a	notion	which	serves	to	define	the	 virtuous	 person,	 whose	 activities,	 in	 turn,	 lead	 to	 a	 happy	 life.	 Thus,	 as	 far	 as	Aristotle’s	 text	 goes,	 a	 virtue	 ethical	 framework	 does	 not	 aid	 our	 exegesis	 or	understanding.		Now	to	the	more	“global”	implications.	If	Aristotle	is	not	a	virtue	ethicist,	what	is	he?	 If	 we	 define	 teleology	 and	 deontology	 as	 comprehensive,	 but	 mutually	 exclusive	
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theories,	 then	 Aristotle’s	 ethics	 has	 to	 be	 one	 or	 the	 other.38	 While	 comparing	 and	contrasting	Aristotle’s	ethics	with	our	normative	theories	may	illuminate	the	structure	of	both	Aristotle’s	and	our	theories,	neither	deontology	nor	teleology	captures	the	spirit	of	Aristotle’s	 ethics.	The	difficulty	of	 slotting	Aristotle’s	 ethics	 into	any	of	 the	existing	normative	 theories	 probably	 contributed	 to	 the	 project	 of	 postulating	 an	 alternative,	namely	 virtue	 ethics	 —	 as	 if	 we	 could	 take	 Aristotle’s	 ethics	 seriously	 only	 if	 he	endorses	 a	 normative	 theory	 recognisable	 by	 us.39	 Conceiving	 of	 Aristotle	 as	deontologist	or	teleologist	(as	understood	in	the	mid-twentieth	century)	masks	what	is	interesting	and	important	about	Aristotle’s	ethics:	its	offering	a	sustained	examination	of	 the	 most	 important	 factors	 for	 the	 good	 life.	 And	 here	 virtue	 ethics,	 especially	eudaimonist	 virtue	 ethics,	 comes	much	 closer	 to	 capturing	what	matters	 to	Aristotle:	happiness,	 lives,	 virtue,	 character,	moral	 psychology,	 friendship	 and	 action.	 However,	this	assessment	rings	true	only	if	we	rely	on	outdated	conceptions	of	the	alternatives.	In	the	wake	of	Anscombe’s	attack	on	modern	moral	philosophy,	ethicists	of	all	stripes	have	attended	more	to	the	issues	close	to	Aristotle’s	heart,	partly	in	response	to	the	impetus	of	 “Aristotelian”	 virtue	 ethicists.	 We	 need	 not	 regard	 Aristotle	 as	 a	 forerunner	 of	contemporary	normative	 theories	 to	 take	him	seriously.	Aristotle’s	contribution	to	re-invigorating	 the	 study	 of	 ethics	 may	 be	 understood	 best	 as	 a	 testament	 to	 the	fruitfulness	of	engaging	with	a	philosopher	who	defies	easy	classification.		Let	us	finally	turn	to	the	implications	for	virtue	ethics.	We	started	with	the	now	outdated	 ostensive	 definition	 of	 virtue	 ethics	 as	 ‘what	 Aristotle	 does’.	 Aristotle,	however,	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 present	 an	 alternative	 to	 teleological	 or	 deontological	theories	 if	we	 take	 their	 respective	accounts	of	 ethically	 good	action	as	 the	 fault-line:	while	the	object	of	wish	is	cast	in	terms	of	goodness,	Aristotle	need	not	take	goodness	to	be	 the	 only	 relevant	 factor	 for	 evaluating	 and	 justifying	 action:	 he	 may	 count	 some	actions	as	to	be	done	or	avoided	simply	in	virtue	of	the	type	of	action,	regardless	of	their	relation	 to	 goodness.40	 In	 any	 case,	 character	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 play	 the	 role	 in	Aristotle’s	account	that	it	does	in	contemporary	virtue	ethics.	So,	virtue	ethicists	could	let	go	of	their	sacred	cow:	Aristotle	helped	shape	contemporary	virtue	ethics,	but	more	as	 instrument	 than	 paradigm.	 Alternatively,	 and	 especially	 in	 the	 light	 of	 recent	
                                                       38	 For	 instance,	 Frankena	 1973:	 15	 writes:	 ‘Deontological	 theories	 deny	 what	teleological	 theories	 affirm.	 They	 deny	 that	 the	 right,	 the	 obligatory,	 and	 the	morally	good	are	wholly,	whether	directly	or	indirectly,	a	function	of	what	is	non-morally	good	or	of	what	promotes	the	greatest	balance	of	good	over	evil	for	self,	one’s	society,	or	the	world	 as	 a	whole.	 They	 assert	 that	 there	 are	 other	 considerations	 that	may	make	 an	action	or	rule	right	or	obligatory	besides	the	goodness	or	badness	of	its	consequences’.	39	 	 Baron	 2011:	 26.	 	 Timmermann	 2015	 develops	 Baron’s	 criticism	 of	 the	 term	‘deontology’	as	a	useful	classification	of	ethical	theories.	40	 Two	 critical	 cases	 are	 i)	 the	wrongness	 and	 badness	 of	 adultery,	 theft	 and	murder	(2.6.1107a11-12)	—	does	he	have	to	say	that	they	are	not	to	be	done	because	they	are	bad?	 And	 ii)	 courageous	 action:	 should	 an	 Athenian	 take	 up	 arms	 to	 defend	 his	 city	because	it	is	good,	or	simply	because	it	is	his	duty?	
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criticism	of	virtue	ethics	as	a	distinct	ethical	system,41	virtue	ethicists	could	curb	their	aspirations	and	return	to	their	roots.	If	virtue	ethics	is	what	Aristotle	does	(or	the	kind	of	thing),	then	virtue	ethics	would	be	what	is	now	called	‘virtue	theory’,	the	systematic	study	of	virtue,	but	not	a	distinct	normative	theory.	The	answer	to	the	question	whether	Aristotle	is	a	virtue	ethicist	will	ultimately	depend	on	which	turn	virtue	ethics	takes:	if	it	presents	 itself	 as	 a	distinct	normative	 theory,	 complete	with	 its	distinctive	account	of	ethically	good	action,	 then	Aristotle	 should	not	be	 regarded	as	a	 sacred	cow;	 if	 virtue	ethics	 presents	 itself	 not	 as	 a	 rival	 to	 already	 existing	 deontological	 or	 teleological	normative	theories,	but	rather	as	the	sustained	study	of	virtue,	then	Aristotle	ought	to	be	revered	as	a	prime	sacred	cow.42		
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